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March 15, 2002 TESTING FOR THE PRESENCE OF FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS IN U.S. 
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES 
 
This paper addresses the issue of perceived financial constraints in agricultural cooperatives. 
Scholars and practitioners have suggested that financial constraints resulting from restricted 
residual claims and imperfect access to external sources of finance is the “Achilles’ heel” of 
agricultural cooperatives in an increasingly concentrated, tightly coordinated, and capital 
intensive food system (Vitaliano 1983, Cook, Holmstrom). Despite many theoretical arguments 
supporting the cooperative capital constraint hypothesis, available empirical evidence is found to 
be inconclusive. Previous applied studies, however, fail to account for the financing needs of 
cooperatives as they focus exclusively on the supply of risk capital. This study provides an 
alternative test of the cooperative financial constraint hypothesis with firm-level panel data 
econometric analysis of cooperative investment behavior. 
Following the corporate (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen) and the farm (Barry, Bierlen 
and Sotomayor) financial constraint literature, this study examines whether agricultural 
cooperatives’ investment is constrained by the availability of capital by estimating neoclassical 
and cash flow augmented Q investment models. In these models, investment demand is 
measured by the Fundamental q approach (Gilchrist and Himmelberg). Additionally, the study 
attempts to identify what cooperative structural and financial management characteristics are 
correlated with credit rationing by means of several sample splits. That is, the investment 
equations are re-estimated separately for different sub-samples constructed on the basis of firm 
asset size, relative amount of permanent equity capital to net worth, and credit risk. Regression 
results suggest that U.S. agricultural cooperatives’ capital expenditures are significantly affected 
  1by the availability of internal funds. Results also indicate that all cooperative sub-samples face 
binding financial constraints when making investment decisions, but some cooperatives appear 
to be less financially constrained than others. 
The Cooperative Capital Constraint Hypothesis 
According to the cooperative capital constraint hypothesis, agricultural cooperatives are unable 
to acquire sufficient risk capital to finance profitable investment opportunities. As a result, 
cooperatives may be insufficiently capitalized to make the necessary investments to grow and 
remain a viable organizational form. The following arguments summarize a vast array of 
theoretical and empirical literature and substantiate the claim that agricultural cooperatives are 
financially constrained: 
1.  Cooperative residual claims are restricted. 
2.  Cooperatives’ vaguely defined property rights structure discourages members from 
contributing risk capital. 
3.  Equity capital acquisition in cooperatives is tied to member patronage (with 
consequent dependence on internally generated capital). 
4.  Cooperative equity capital is generally not permanent. 
5.  Cooperatives have limited access to external sources of funds. 
The first argument in support of the capital constraint hypothesis is that cooperatives 
have restricted residual claims as only active producer-members may provide the cooperative 
organization with voting equity capital (Fama and Jensen). As a result, risk capital acquisition in 
the cooperative firm is limited by current members’ number, wealth, and risk bearing capacity. 
This constraint becomes more pronounced (i) as the pool of potential equity capital suppliers to 
cooperatives decreases as a result of farm consolidation (Hoppe); (ii) as net farm income 
  2becomes more volatile and increasingly dependent on public policy support (Gardner); and (iii) 
as farmers face their own financial constraints due to imperfections in agricultural credit markets 
(Hubbard and Kashyap). In addition to being restricted to members, cooperative residual claims 
are non-transferable, preventing the emergence of a secondary market for cooperative equity 
securities. The inalienability of cooperative residual claims is at the roots of portfolio, horizon, 
and control problems (Jensen and Meckling). 
A second argument supporting the cooperative capital constraint hypothesis is that the 
property rights allocation in cooperatives does not provide members incentives to invest risk 
capital. Because cooperatives return earnings to members in proportion to patronage rather than 
ownership, cooperatives generally pay zero or low dividend rates on equity capital. In addition, 
cooperative residual claims are not appreciable since they are non-transferable and redeemable at 
book value. Consequently, members derive benefits from the cooperative mainly through usage 
in the form of favorable prices and patronage refunds. “There is a free-rider problem because 
patrons share in the return on cooperative equity capital whether or not they invest in the 
cooperative” (Knoeber and Baumer, p. 31). Free-rider behavior causes members to underfinance 
the cooperative by increasing their patronage relative to investment. In addition to the free-rider 
problem, portfolio and horizon problems further reduce members’ incentives to contribute risk 
capital (Cook and Iliopoulos). 
The third argument is that cooperatives depend on internally generated capital and 
earnings from non-member business as sources of equity capital. As there are few incentives for 
direct member investment, cooperatives rely primarily on patronage-based methods for acquiring 
equity capital including retained patronage refunds and per unit capital retains. Dependence on 
internally generated capital is not necessarily a handicap to cooperatives given that retained 
  3earnings is also the main source of finance in IOFs (Myers and Majluf; Brealey, Myers and 
Marcus). Some authors suggest, however, that the cooperative’s ability to generate earnings 
might be constrained by user ownership (Staatz) and low market share in high margin, value 
added industries (Rogers). 
The fourth argument substantiating the cooperative capital constraint hypothesis is that 
equity capital recorded on the cooperative balance sheet is not permanent because retained 
patronage refunds and per unit capital retains are generally allocated to individual members’ 
accounts. Allocated equity accounts represent a claim against the cooperative akin to non-interest 
bearing debt. This claim is redeemable subject to the discretion of the board of directors. 
Because redeeming equity is a cash outlay to the cooperative, a large portion of its equity capital 
stock is not permanent and long-term growth cannot be sustained (Caves and Petersen). 
The final argument is that agricultural cooperatives have limited access to outside sources 
of finance. Because cooperative residual claims are restricted to members and cannot be 
marketed, access to public equity markets is not a viable option unless the firm changes its 
organizational form (Hart and Moore). Cooperatives also lack access to adequate sources of debt 
capital because they do not possess enough net worth or collateralizable assets. Favorable access 
to loan capital notwithstanding, applied research conducted in the 1980s found that cooperatives 
experience higher after-tax long term borrowing costs than other business forms (Vitaliano 
1980). 
Despite such theoretical arguments in support of the cooperative capital constraint 
hypothesis, the available empirical evidence is not conclusive. Two distinct, but related, 
approaches are identified in the empirical literature examining the cooperative capital constraint 
hypothesis: growth studies and empirical tests of the cooperative equity constraint hypothesis. 
  4Cooperative growth studies are part of an extensive applied literature evaluating the economic 
performance of user-owned organizations in comparison to investor-oriented firms (IOFs) and 
other organizational forms. Asset or sales growth is commonly used as an alternative 
performance measure in addition to economic efficiency, financial ratios, and firm survival 
(Schrader et al.). Growth studies have found that cooperatives experienced higher growth rates 
than comparable IOFs in the 1970s (Chen, Babb and Schrader) and that the long-term growth 
rate of seven large North American cooperatives is not constrained by size, but is “low, perhaps 
even zero” (Fulton et al., p. 258). 
In two separate empirical studies, Lerman and Parliament examine the cooperative equity 
constraint hypothesis by comparing the capital structure of cooperatives relative to IOFs. 
Cooperatives are viewed as “equity bound” and, consequently, are expected to be more 
leveraged than comparable IOFs. In the first paper, Lerman and Parliament (1993a) observe that 
cooperatives do not borrow more than comparable IOFs. In the second paper, Lerman and 
Parliament (1993b) study the financing of asset growth among agricultural cooperatives. 
Contrary to theoretical expectations, cooperative equity capital is not statistically different from 
the national average of non-financial corporations between 1973 and 1983, and is higher than the 
national average after 1984 when IOFs became increasingly leveraged. Lerman and Parliament’s 
results have been confirmed by other studies of cooperative financial performance (Hind, Royer). 
Based on these findings it might be concluded that agricultural cooperatives are not 
financially constrained – they grow as fast and are as leveraged as comparable IOFs. However, 
one must be careful in reaching conclusions because these studies are not designed to directly 
test the cooperative capital constraint hypothesis. The objective of growth studies is to evaluate 
the relative performance of organizational forms or the effects of equity management practices 
  5on cooperative growth. However, evidence of sluggish cooperative growth is often interpreted as 
a consequence of financial constraints. The same argument applies to studies of cooperative 
capital structure. As noted by Lerman and Parliament (1993b, p. 439), “the observation of high 
equity financing proportions among the sample of cooperatives does not, however, 
unambiguously resolve the hypothesis of equity constraints in cooperatives.” Perhaps more 
importantly, the methodologies applied in previous research do not account for the financing 
needs of cooperatives, i.e., the demand for investment funds. Previous empirical studies focus 
exclusively on the supply of capital and, consequently, fail to address a more fundamental issue 
– is the supply of risk capital enough to finance the demand for investment funds? This study is 
designed to fill this void in the literature and test the cooperative capital constraint hypothesis 
with panel data econometric analysis of U.S. agricultural cooperatives’ investment behavior. 
The Q Theory of Firm Investment 
The empirical analysis of the cooperative capital constraint hypothesis is based on the Q theory 
of investment and its subsequent extensions including the effects of informational imperfections 
on firm investment behavior. Departing from the static nature of the neoclassical model of 
investment (Jorgenson), the Q theory is explicitly derived from the firm’s dynamic profit 
maximization problem. Let profits for firm i at any time t (Πit) be determined by its capital stock 
(Kit) and an stochastic variable (σit), assuming all other production inputs are “maximized out” in 
that they are already utilized at their optimum levels. Assume further that capital is the only 
quasi-fixed input as net increments to the firm’s capital stock are subject to adjustment costs 
represented by the convex function C( ). The firm’s optimization problem is thus to choose 
investment to maximize its market value given by: 
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  6subject to the capital accumulation constraint given by 
(2) Kis = Iis + (1 – δi) Ki,s-1, 
where δi represents the firm’s constant rate of capital depreciation. In this formulation of the firm 
dynamic optimization problem, i and t denote the firm and time period respectively, Eit is the 
expectations operator with a subscript indicating the information available to the i
th firm at time 
t, Iit denotes investment (capital expenditures), and βi
s is the discount factor adopted by the i
th 
firm. New capital resulting from investment is expected to become productive within the year. 
The first-order condition for maximizing equation (1) with respect to investment yields 
the Marginal q specification: 
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The right-hand side in equation (3) is Marginal q, which is defined in equation (4) as the 
expected discounted value of profits from new capital investment – that is, the “shadow price” of 
capital. The firm maximizes its market value by equating the marginal benefits of an additional 
dollar of investment (Marginal q) to the concomitant marginal costs given by the relative price of 
investment and the marginal adjustment cost. To obtain an estimable specification for the Q 
investment equation, a functional form for the adjustment cost function, C, must be introduced. 
This study follows Hayashi and specifies C as being linearly homogeneous in investment and 
capital: 
(5) C(Iit, Kit) = (α/2) [Iit/Kit – ai – τit]
2 Kit , 
  7where α is the slope of the adjustment cost function, ai represents firm-specific effects, and τit is 
the technology shock. Partially differentiating equation (5) with respect to investment and 
substituting the resulting CI(Iit, Kit) into equation (3) yields the investment equation: 
(6) Iit/Kit = ai + (1/α) qit + τit + εit, 
where εit is an optimization (or expectations) error. 
Under the conditions assumed by the Q theory of investment – in particular, that capital 
markets are frictionless – external and internal sources of funds are perfect substitutes. As a 
result, financial variables play no role in capital spending. The Q theory predicts that capital 
spending only responds to Marginal q, a measure of future investment opportunities. Since 
Marginal q is unobservable, Tobin’s Average q is commonly used as a proxy variable in 
empirical studies based on the Q theory of investment. Tobin’s q constructed from financial 
market data is an appropriate measure of Marginal q under certain conditions – including 
competitive product and factor markets, homogeneity of fixed capital, linearly homogeneous 
production and adjustment cost technologies, and independent investment and financing 
decisions (Hayashi). Under these conditions, the value of the firm reflects the economic rents 
from existing capital stock. As a result, the empirical specification of the Q investment equation 
is commonly represented by: 
(7) Iit/Kit = ai + b Qit + τit + εit, 
where b = (1/α) and Qit is the tax-adjusted value of Tobin’s q. 
In his survey of the empirical investment literature following the advent of the Q theory, 
Chirinko observes that equation (7) is the most popular explicit model of firm investment 
behavior. Yet the empirical performance of the model has been unsatisfactory both in terms of 
the statistical significance of Marginal q and the model’s overall explanatory power. 
  8Furthermore, financial and capacity variables are consistently found to be statistically significant 
when included in the Q investment model specification. 
The Role of Financial Variables in the Investment Equation 
Introducing informational imperfections in capital markets extends the neoclassical Q theory of 
investment. By relaxing the perfect capital market assumption, Modigliani and Miller’s 
irrelevance proposition is rejected – that is, investment and financing decisions might affect one 
another. Stiglitz and Weiss’ model of credit markets with asymmetric information show that an 
increase in the interest rate charged by a lender causes borrowers to increase investment projects 
risk. As a result, the lender maximizes profits by simply restricting the supply of loans to 
borrowers leading to credit rationing. Myers and Majluf demonstrate that asymmetric 
information between managers and outside investors regarding the profitability of an investment 
project causes the firm to forego positive net present value projects. Under these circumstances, 
the firm’s ability to invest is affected by its capital structure. 
Asymmetric information models find that the presence of information problems in capital 
markets lead to a cost wedge between external finance and internally generated funds. As a 
result, the supply curve of finance is a horizontal segment up to the firm’s total net worth but is 
upward-sloping beyond that point as the firm seeks external funds to finance investment projects. 
In addition, these models posit that the slope of the supply curve of finance is proportional to 
information costs between the firm and suppliers of external funds. In other words, “in the 
presence of incentive problems and costly monitoring of managerial actions, external suppliers 
of funds to firms require a higher return to compensate them for these monitoring costs and the 
potential moral hazard associated with managers’ control over the allocation of investment 
  9funds” (Hubbard, p. 194). Holding information costs constant, an increase in net worth causes a 
shift of the supply of funds schedule to the right. 
This argument provides the theoretical underpinning for including proxy variables for 
changes in net worth (e.g., cash flow) in the standard Q investment equation. Consequently, the 
benchmark Q model of investment presented in the previous section may be expanded as 
follows: 
(8) Iit/Kit = ai + b Qit + c CFit + τit + εit, 
where CFit represents cash flow for the i
th firm at time t. Despite recent debate (Kaplan and 
Zingales, Gomes), a positive and statistically significant cash flow coefficient in the investment 
equation is often interpreted as evidence of financial constraints. 
On the basis of the empirical specification laid out in equation (8), studies of capital 
market imperfections affecting investment behavior utilize firm-level panel data in which firms 
are grouped into “high information cost” and “low information cost” categories. Theory suggests 
that firms facing informational problems in capital markets are prone to experience credit 
rationing and binding financial constraints when making investment decisions. As a result, the 
difference between the estimated cash flow coefficients across sub-samples provides a stronger 
evidence of financial constraints in the sample. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen identify “high 
information cost” manufacturing corporations on the basis of a priori information on observed 
dividend payout policies. They estimate a Q investment equation with cash flow as a proxy for 
changes in net worth. Their empirical results – along with those of Hoshi, Kashyap and 
Scharfstein, Blundell et al., and Schaller, among others – indicate a substantially greater 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow in firms classified a priori as “constrained.” 
  10Subsequently, Gilchrist and Himmelberg propose an alternative proxy variable 
(Fundamental q) to measure firm investment opportunities instead of Tobin’s q. The authors 
estimate a set of vector autoregression (VAR) forecasting equations based on the firm’s 
fundamentals and use the estimates from the VAR system to construct Marginal q. The 
importance of Gilchrist and Himmelberg’s work is twofold. First, Fundamental q appears to be a 
better proxy for Marginal q than Tobin’s q because it does not rely on the conditions set forth by 
Hayashi. Second, using Fundamental q as a measure of Marginal q, the Q model of investment 
can be estimated for nonpublic firms for which market data is not available. Following Gilchrist 
and Himmelberg, the Fundamental q approach has been applied to the study of financial 
constraints in the farm sector (Bierlen and Featherstone, Barry, Bierlen and Sotomayor, 
Gutierrez). This paper utilizes the Fundamental q approach to examine the investment behavior 
of another set of privately held firms – agricultural cooperatives. 
The Sample and Research Procedures 
Empirical testing of the cooperative capital constraint hypothesis is based on a firm-level panel 
data set of U.S. agricultural cooperatives. The data set used in this study is consistent, as the data 
provider collects and standardizes financial data for all firms included in the sample. This 
centralized approach ensures accurate comparisons among cross-sectional units throughout the 
study period. In addition, the majority of the cooperatives in the sample produce audited annual 
financial reports certified by a CPA firm and prepared under Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). 
The data set includes annual accounting information of 1,271 U.S. agricultural 
cooperatives during the years 1991-2000 (Table 1). When compared to the 1999 cooperative 
statistics published by the USDA Rural Business–Cooperative Service (RBS), the sample 
  11represents 36 percent of the total number of U.S. agricultural cooperatives. The firms in the 
sample generated $93.7 billion in sales and had $44.4 billion in assets in 1999, which correspond 
respectively to 81 and 93 percent of the totals reported by RBS. The sample includes local farm 
supply and grain marketing cooperatives, processing cooperatives with operations in 
manufacturing industries, agricultural production and service cooperatives, wholesale trade 
cooperatives, and cooperatives involved in transportation and warehousing activities. 
<Insert Table 1> 
The panel is, however, not balanced as the number of firms varies throughout the study 
period (Table 1). In order to construct a balanced panel, firms with less than 10 years of data for 
the variables of interest are dropped from the sample. This procedure reduces the number of 
cooperatives in the sample to 597. In addition, firms with large discontinuities in the reported 
book value of their physical capital stock are also excluded from the sample. Large 
discontinuities in net fixed assets are often caused by mergers, acquisitions, asset divestitures, 
and data errors. This criterion removes 90 firms from the sample, leaving a final sample of 507 
firms. 
The data used in constructing measures of the variables included in the specification of 
the investment equation is obtained from agricultural cooperatives’ financial statements. There 
exist a variety of problems associated with translating accounting information into economic 
variables, including data reporting biases (Watts and Zimmerman). Nevertheless, the approach 
taken here is similar to that of other researchers who have estimated investment equations based 
on publicly available accounting data of IOFs (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson, Blundell et 
al.). 
  12The dependent variable in the model is investment (Iit), measured as capital expenditures 
for the construction and acquisition of physical assets (property, plant and equipment). Data on 
agricultural cooperatives’ capital expenditures are not available as few cooperatives actually 
report capital expenditures. As a result, cooperative investment must be inferred from changes in 
physical assets between subsequent years. This study follows Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein 
and measures cooperative investment as the change in the stock of depreciable capital (net fixed 
assets) from the previous year plus capital depreciation during the year. 
The explanatory variables in the estimable investment model are cash flow and marginal 
profitability of capital. Cash flow (CFit) in IOFs is obtained by adding non-cash cost items, such 
as depreciation and amortization, to income after interest and taxes and before extraordinary 
items (net income). In the computation of agricultural cooperative cash flow, it is not only 
important to distinguish between cash and non-cash items, but also to recognize sources and uses 
of cash that are unique to cooperative organizations. The net income series in our data set is 
consistent among pooling and non-pooling cooperatives as pool distributions are included as an 
item in “cost of goods sold” in the computation of pooling cooperatives’ net income. However, 
the cooperative net income series includes gains or losses on asset sales and sundry after-tax 
extraordinary items. Additionally, there are sources of cash flow that are unique to cooperatives, 
including cash and non-cash patronage income, per unit capital retains and retained patronage 
refunds. This study computes cooperative cash flow as the sum of net income, depreciation and 
amortization, but deducts non-cash patronage income, patronage dividends paid in cash, net 
retirements of allocated equity (including retains revolved), gains or losses on asset sales, and 
after-tax extraordinary items from cooperative net income. 
  13In the construction of investment and cash flow series, the variables are first deflated by 
the GDP Implicit Price Deflator. Subsequently, investment and cash flow are normalized by the 
firm’s capital stock in the beginning of the year to eliminate scale effects. Capital stock is 
generally measured at replacement cost with the perpetual inventory method (Salinger and 
Summers). However, this method depends on the availability of the firm’s annual capital 
expenditures, which is not available in our data set. Consequently, capital stock is measured as 
net property, plant and equipment (i.e., net fixed assets). This book value measure of the capital 
stock differs from the replacement cost measure, as reported net fixed assets is sensitive to the 
accounting depreciation schedule adopted by each firm in the sample. 
The marginal profitability of capital (Qit), a measure of investment demand, is 
constructed from the estimates of a bivariate VAR system of order 3. This study follows 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg’s method and includes cash flow, as previously defined (CFit/Kit), and 
the ratio of sales over capital (Sit/Kit) in the VAR system. In the estimation of the VAR 
forecasting system with the cooperative panel data set, all variables are first-differenced in order 
to eliminate fixed-firm effects (Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen). Additionally, the model 
includes time dummies to account for aggregate shocks. The VAR system is estimated with the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. The use of GMM is necessary in this context 
as it is a heteroskedasticity robust estimator that accommodates the presence of endogeneity in 
the model (Mátyás). The instrument list includes lags 2 to 4 of CFit/Kit and Sit/Kit, as any lagged 
values beyond the first lag are valid instruments (Griliches and Hausman). The estimates of the 
VAR are then used to construct Fundamental q (Fit), defined as: 
(9) Fit = [c’ –  (I – λA)]
-1 Xit, 
  14where Xit is a vector containing CFit/Kit as the j
th element and Sit/Kit, c is a conformable vector of 
zeros with a 1 in the j
th row, I is the identity matrix, λ is a constant representing the discount 
factor and the depreciation rate, and A is the matrix of VAR coefficient estimates. Given the 
order of the VAR and the lags involved in constructing model variables, the initial 5 years of the 
panel cannot be used in estimating the investment model. The investment model is, therefore, 
estimated for the years 1996-2001. 
It is a common practice in the empirical investment literature to exclude from the sample 
firms with extreme values of investment, cash flow, Tobin’s Q or other variables of interest. This 
study utilizes an alternative procedure to treat outliers in that observations are “winsorized” if the 
value of the variable exceeds pre-determined cutoff values (Cleary). This approach reduces the 
impact of extreme observations in the regression analysis and allows the use of a larger number 
of observations than would be possible if these extreme observations were deleted from the 
sample. Summary statistics for the balanced panel of 507 firms is shown in Table 2. 
<Insert Table 2> 
Construction of Sub-Samples 
This study investigates three alternative sample splits to discern financially constrained from 
unconstrained firms in the balanced panel: firm size, permanent equity capital, and credit risk. 
The justification for using the size variable as a sample splitting criterion is that small firms are 
more likely to face financing constraints because they are typically younger, less well-known, 
and hence more vulnerable to capital market imperfections induced by information asymmetries 
and collateral constraints (Schaller). This study uses total assets to measure the size of 
cooperative firms. As firm size is a continuous variable, the sample splitting criterion is whether 
total assets for a given cooperative is above or below a pre-determined cutoff value. In order to 
  15identify a subset of firms that face binding capital constraints with high probability, a firm is 
identified as constrained if its size falls below the 25
th percentile in 1991. In doing so, the size 
criterion distinguishes between 127 small firms and 380 large firms. Summary descriptive 
statistics for sub-samples are shown in Table 3. The average size for the 380 large firms is $38.3 
million, whereas the average size for the 127 small firms is slightly above $2 million. 
<Insert Table 3> 
Another criterion to distinguish potentially financially constrained cooperatives from 
unconstrained cooperatives is to examine the amount of permanent equity capital relative to total 
net worth. Permanent equity capital is defined as the sum of common stock, preferred stock and 
unallocated equity and is intended to measure the amount of “true” equity capital held by 
agricultural cooperatives. The rationale for using this criterion is that cooperatives with relatively 
high amounts of permanent equity might have more favorable access to external sources of 
finance. Additionally, cooperatives with low amounts of permanent equity need to constantly 
redeem allocated equity to member-patrons, which is a source of cash outlays that decreases the 
volume of internally generated capital available for investment. Since permanent equity capital is 
a continuous variable, the sample splitting criterion is based on a pre-determined cutoff value. A 
firm is classified as “low permanent equity (PEK)” if it falls below the 25
th percentile. This 
criterion identifies 127 “low PEK” firms and 380 “high PEK” firms. “Low PEK” firms have on 
average 15 percent of permanent equity and 83 percent of allocated equity relative to total net 
worth (Table 3). In contrast, “high PEK” firms have on average net worth consisting of 47 
percent of permanent equity and 51 percent of allocated equity. Unallocated equity is the largest 
component of permanent equity capital in both sub-samples, as U.S. cooperatives have in general 
relatively low amounts of common and preferred stock (USDA). 
  16In addition to firm asset size and relative amount of permanent equity capital, this study 
uses credit risk (Z-Score) as a sample splitting criterion. The Z-Score is a measure for predicting 
bankruptcy that lenders use in conjunction with other credit scoring techniques to assess the 
probability that a customer will not pay (Brealey, Myers and Marcus). Given the dependence of 
most agricultural cooperatives on borrowed capital as a source of external funds, the ability to 
access credit markets might distinguish financially constrained from non-constrained 
cooperatives. Z-Score is a continuous variable and sample splitting is based on a pre-determined 
cutoff value. A firm is classified as “high risk” if it falls below the 25
th percentile in the Z-Score 
sample distribution. This criterion identifies 125 “high risk” firms and 382 “low risk” firms. 
“High risk” cooperatives have an average Z-Score of 4.05, whereas the average for the “low 
risk” sub-sample is 5.01 (Table 3). “High risk” cooperatives have relatively lower amounts of 
unallocated equity and permanent equity, in addition to being more leveraged and less liquid 
than “low risk” cooperatives. 
Empirical Results 
In this section, the empirical results from estimating the Q investment model for the sample of 
U.S. agricultural cooperatives are analyzed. The restricted and the cash flow augmented Q 
investment models are estimated with the GMM estimator. GMM is an instrumental variable 
technique that corrects the potential errors-in-variables bias introduced by Fundamental q. 
Full sample empirical results lend support to the hypothesis that agricultural cooperatives 
are financially constrained (Table 4). The unrestricted Q model adds explanatory power to 
cooperative physical capital investment when compared to the restricted model without cash 
flow. The positive signs and high t-ratios on all estimated investment model parameters indicate 
that both Marginal q and cash flow are significant explanatory variables of cooperative physical 
  17capital investment. The fact that cooperative investment is significantly sensitive to cash flow 
suggests the presence of binding financial constraints in the full cooperative sample. 
<Insert Table 4> 
Since the magnitudes of parameter estimates are dependent on the levels of the variables 
included in the model, elasticities are better representatives of the sensitivity of investment to the 
explanatory variables. Elasticity estimates are calculated at the means of each independent 
variable. In the restricted model, the elasticity for the Fundamental q parameter is 0.322, i.e., 
investment expenditure is inelastic with respect to the marginal profitability of capital. In the 
unrestricted model, the elasticity estimate for Fundamental q is 0.162 and 0.208 for cash flow. In 
other words, a one percent change in the ratio of cash flow to capital is expected to prompt an 
increase in the ratio of investment to capital of approximately 0.2 percent. Using median values 
of investment and cash flow it is possible to compute how investment responds to changes in 
cash flow in nominal terms. Based on the GMM cash flow elasticity estimate, a one standard 
deviation change in cash flow equal to $106,285 will prompt an increase of $23,824 in capital 
expenditures. This calculation is extended to the 2,535 observations in the balanced panel. 
Results show that the incremental investment associated with an increase in cash flow is within 
the bounds of that cash flow in 93 percent of the total number of firm-years. This result suggests 
that incremental investment could have been fully financed by changes in cash flow and, 
therefore, is not necessarily financed by leveraged funds. This provides further evidence that 
cooperatives depend on internal funds to finance investment, which is consistent with the 
financial constraint interpretation of the role of cash flow in the investment equation. 
In order to ascertain whether cooperative structural and financial attributes affect the 
magnitude and statistical significance of the sensitivity of investment to cash flow, the 
  18investment equations are estimated separately for each of the aforementioned sub-samples. In 
order to do so, the VAR forecasting system is estimated and parameter estimates are used in the 
construction of Fundamental q for each sub-sample. The investment equation is then re-
estimated for the “constrained” and “unconstrained” sub-samples with the GMM estimator. 
The results found in Table 4 show the effects of Fundamental q and cash flow on large 
and small cooperative investment behavior. All GMM parameter estimates are positive in the 
unrestricted model, as predicted by theory. Fundamental q parameter estimates are not 
statistically significant, whereas cash flow coefficients for both sub-samples are statistically 
significant. That is, cooperative investment does not appear to be affected by Marginal q, but it 
responds significantly to cash flow. This result suggests that both large and small cooperatives 
are financially constrained. Contrary to theoretical expectations, the sensitivity of investment to 
cash flow for the large cooperative sub-sample is found to be larger than the investment-to-cash 
flow sensitivity of small cooperatives. The null hypothesis that small and large cooperative cash 
flow coefficients are equal is probed with the t-test, which indicates that the null hypothesis of 
parameter equality should be rejected. It is, therefore, concluded that small cooperatives appear 
to be less financially constrained than large cooperatives. 
In the regression of the investment model for the sub-samples based on permanent equity 
capital, the Fundamental q coefficient estimates are positive but not statistically significant 
(Table 4). The cash flow coefficient estimates, in turn, are positive and statistically significant 
for both sub-samples, indicating that high and low PEK cooperatives are financially constrained. 
The investment-to-cash flow sensitivity is found to be larger for the low PEK cooperatives, 
corroborating the theoretical prediction. The null hypothesis of cash flow parameter equality is 
  19rejected. It is concluded that high PEK cooperative firms are less financially constrained than 
low PEK counterparts when making investment decisions. 
Table 4 also provides parameter estimates for high credit risk and low credit risk 
cooperatives. All parameter estimates have the correct anticipated sign, that is, investment 
expenditures are positively correlated with both Fundamental q and cash flow. As the parameters 
for Fundamental q are not statistically significant in either of the two sub-samples, it is 
concluded that investment behavior is not affected by the marginal profitability of capital. Cash 
flow coefficients are statistically significant for both high credit risk and low credit risk 
cooperatives. This result suggests that both sub-samples are financially constrained. The cash 
flow coefficient for the low risk sub-sample is found to be smaller relative to the high-risk sub-
sample, as expected from the theoretical discussion. On the basis of the t-test for parameter 
equality, it is concluded that high credit risk cooperatives are more financially constrained than 
low credit risk cooperatives. 
In sum, the tests for excess sensitivity of investment to cash flow show that all the 
cooperative sub-samples face binding financial constraints when making investment decisions, 
but some cooperatives appear to be less financially constrained than others. In particular, small 
cooperatives, cooperatives with relatively high amounts of permanent equity capital, and low 
credit risk cooperatives are found to be less constrained than their large, low permanent equity 
capital, and high credit risk counterparts. The estimation of the investment model with sub-
sample data provides further support to the financial constraint interpretation of cash flow in 
agricultural cooperative investment behavior. 
Summary and Conclusions 
  20It is commonly argued in the literature that agricultural cooperatives are financially constrained 
because they are unable to acquire sufficient risk capital to invest in productive assets. In this 
research we addressed the issue of capital constraints in agricultural cooperatives and examined 
whether physical capital investment is constrained by availability of finance. It was observed that 
cooperative investment responds positively and significantly to both the marginal profitability of 
capital and cash flow. When the cash flow variable was included in the investment equation with 
Fundamental q, there was a positive and statistically significant correlation between investment 
and cash flow for the full cooperative sample. In other words, cash flow appears to have 
influence on cooperative investment over and above its predictive content about the future 
profitability of capital. 
In addition, the tests for excess sensitivity of investment to cash flow were extended to 
three a priori sample splitting criteria used to sort cooperatives into sub-samples of “constrained” 
and “unconstrained” firms. It was found that all cooperative sub-samples face binding financial 
constraints when making investment decisions, but some cooperatives appear to be less 
financially constrained than others. In particular, small cooperatives, cooperatives with relatively 
high amounts of permanent equity capital, and low credit risk cooperatives were found to be less 
constrained than their large, low permanent equity capital, and high credit risk counterparts. 
Investment constraints arise in agricultural cooperatives as a result of free rider, horizon, 
and portfolio problems (Cook and Iliopoulos). Vaguely defined property rights emerge in 
cooperatives because residual claims are restricted to members, non-transferable, redeemable, 
and with benefit distribution proportional to usage rather than shareholdings. If agricultural 
cooperatives are to remain viable organizations in the 21
st century, their leaders might need to 
revisit these restrictions on residual claims. This study does not empirically establish that the 
  21nature of cooperative residual claims causes financial constraints. Nor does it claim that 
eliminating restrictions on residual claims is a sufficient condition to ameliorating financial 
constraints in agricultural cooperatives. However, the theoretical analysis of the cooperative 
capital constraint hypothesis suggests that eliminating restrictions on residual claims might be a 
necessary condition for the attenuation of capital constraints in agricultural cooperatives. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, cooperatives are adopting new organizational structures that 
relax some restrictions on traditional cooperative residual claims. Instead of demutualizing or 
converting to IOFs, as occurred with mutual firms in other industries, agricultural cooperatives 
seek to ameliorate capital constraints while maintaining user ownership and control. The survival 
and growth of agricultural cooperatives in responding to the challenges brought about by 
agroindustrialization will likely depend on the relative efficiency of such organizational 
innovations. 
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Year 
Number of 
Cooperatives Sales  Total  Assets 
 
Net Worth  Net Income 
1991 700  $32,050  $12,403  $5,086  $1,058 
1992 880  $46,670  $18,967  $7,807  $1,460 
1993 998  $51,744  $21,995  $9,266  $1,330 
1994 1,184  $64,040  $26,012  $10,835  $1,995 
1995 1,224  $86,765  $33,718  $12,856  $2,145 
1996 1,241  $105,214  $39,318  $14,551  $2,588 
1997 1,248  $113,334  $42,207  $16,086  $2,483 
1998 1,251  $110,597  $48,416  $18,246  $2,081 
1999 1,245  $93,655  $44,420  $17,634  $1,415 
2000 1,150  $88,421  $41,510  $16,534  $1,175 
 













Iit  Investment 
(US$ Million) 
1.944 
(10.835)  -69.283  0.340  247.378 
CFit  Cash Flow  
(US$ Million) 
1.549 
(8.827)  -17.650  0.304  200.758 
Sit  Sales 
(US$ Million) 
65.720 
(429.315)  0.056  9.655  12,239.000 
Kit  Capital Stock 
(US$ Million) 
6.883 






(0.30)  -1.38  0.27  2.00 
CFit/Kit  Cash Flow / 
Capital Stock 
0.28 
(0.34)  -1.37  0.24  5.00 
Sit/Kit  Sales / 
Capital Stock 
10.27 
(6.65)  0.25  8.89  30.00 
Fit  Fundamental Q 
 
0.92 
(0.54)  -1.85  0.72  7.70 
Note: Total number of observations in the panel is 2,535. 
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 Table 4. Effects of Fundamental q and Cash Flow on Cooperative Investment, 1996-2000 
 
The dependent variable is the investment-capital ratio (Iit/Kit), where Iit is investment in physical assets and Kit is beginning-of-period 
capital stock. Explanatory variables include Fundamental q, constructed from estimates of a bivariate VAR (3) forecasting system, and 
(CFit/Kit), which is the cash flow-to-capital ratio. All variables are first-differenced to eliminate firm-fixed effects. The equations are 
estimated with fixed year effects, which are not reported. The instrument set includes lags 2 to 4 of (CFit/Kit) and (Sit/Kit). Standard 















































































































Observations  2,535              635 1,900 635 1,900 625 1,910
* Coefficient estimates are statistically significant at 1% confidence level. 
** Coefficient estimates are statistically significant at 5% confidence level. 